Block Argumentation by Arisaka, Ryuta et al.
Block Argumentation
Ryuta Arisaka, Stefano Bistarelli and Francesco Santini
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Perugia, Italy
ryutaarisaka@gmail.com, firstname.lastname@unipg.it
Abstract. We contemplate a higher-level bipolar abstract argumentation for non-
elementary arguments such as: X argues against Y’s sincerity with the fact that Y has
presented his argument to draw a conclusion C, by omitting other facts which would
not have validated C. Argumentation involving such arguments requires us to poten-
tially consider an argument as a coherent block of argumentation, i.e. an argument
may itself be an argumentation. In this work, we formulate block argumentation as
a specific instance of Dung-style bipolar abstract argumentation with the dual nature
of arguments. We consider internal consistency of an argument(ation) under a set of
constraints, of graphical (syntactic) and of semantic nature, and formulate accept-
ability semantics in relation to them. We discover that classical acceptability seman-
tics do not in general hold good with the constraints. In particular, acceptability of
unattacked arguments is not always warranted. Further, there may not be a unique
minimal member in complete semantics, thus sceptic (grounded) semantics may not
be its subset. To retain set-theoretically minimal semantics as a subset of complete
semantics, we define semi-grounded semantics. Through comparisons, we show how
the concept of block argumentation may further generalise structured argumentation.
1 Introduction
In higher-level argumentation [12], or temporal/modal argumentation networks [3], an ar-
gumentation F1 may be substituted into an argument of a given argumentation F2. In the
case of higher-level argumentation, the key is to find out which arguments in F1 may be
attacking or attacked by other arguments in F2. In meta-level argumentation [15,22], prop-
erties of argumentation at object level - such as whether an object-level argument attacks
another object-level argument, or the trustworthiness of an arguer - may be discussed in an
argumentation about the object-level argumentation.
In a realistic argumentation, it can of course happen that some agent argues about
some attack of an argument a1 on an argument a2. However, that may not be at meta-
level; the agent’s argument could be in the same argumentation with a1 and a2, interacting
with any arguments in the argumentation. Thus, the clear-cut distinction between object-
level and meta-level argumentations does not always apply. Further, it may be that some
argumentation F itself as an argument aF attacks an argument, in which case it is not the
case that we must seek the origin of the attack in arguments in F , which does not conform
to the principle of higher-level argumentation.
Seeing the gap, in this work, we formulate block argumentation, where an argumenta-
tion may be an argument and vice-versa, for non-elementary arguments such as: X argues
against Y’s sincerity with the fact that Y has presented his argument to draw a conclusion
C, by omitting other facts which would not have validated C. This argument is in the form:
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“The argument:[the argument:[other facts attack C] attacks the argument:[some facts sup-
port C]] attacks Y’s sincerity.”, indicating an argument may be a block of argumentation.
Having such an argument blurs the boundary between an argumentation and an ar-
gument, leaving the differentiation only up to the perspective one employs. While block
argumentation as we show is a specific instance of Dung-style bipolar abstract argumen-
tation (see practical motivation for bipolar argumentation in, e.g. [9,1,20]) with the dual
nature in arguments, it propels us to contemplate internal consistency of an argument. For
example, one may (or may not) find “The conclusion by X in the past that Y was a terrorist
corroborates X’s sinister personality” factually inconsistent if there was no such conclu-
sion by X.1 Ergo, we posit a set of constraints, of graphical (syntactic) and semantic nature,
which one may choose to impose on a block argumentation, and we characterise its accept-
ability semantics in accordance with them. As we are to show, classical Dung acceptability
semantics do not in general hold good once these constraints are taken into consideration.
In particular, unattacked arguments may not be outright acceptable. Further, there may be
more than one minimal member in complete semantics, thus the sceptic (grounded) seman-
tics may not form its subset; such situation has already arisen in the context of weighted
argumentation [5,4]. To retain set-theoretically minimal semantics as a subset of complete
semantics, we define semi-grounded semantics.
The paper has the following structure: in Section 2 we motivate our approach with a
real legal example from a popular case. Section 3 reports the necessary technical prelim-
inaries. Section 4 presents block (bipolar) argumentation with formal results (e.g. on the
existence of semantics). Finally in Section 5, we wrap up the paper with related work,
where we discuss ABA-style structured argumentation [11], noting how the concept of
block argumentation may further generalise the formalism.
2 Motivation for Block Argumentation
During the still ongoing trial over the death of Kim Jong-Nam2, a certain argumentation
was deployed by a suspect’s defence lawyer as he cast a blame on Malaysian authorities
for having released only portions of CCTV footage of the fatal attack. Broadly:
Prosecutor: the CCTV footage released by Malaysian Police shows a suspect walking
quickly to an airport restroom to wash hands after attacking the victim with VX, which
produces an impression that the suspect, contrary to her own statement that she thought
she was acting for a prank video, knew what was on her hands.
Defence Lawyer: however, the CCTV footage in its entirety shows the suspect adjusting
her glasses after the attack, with VX on her hands, which counter-evidences her knowl-
edge of the substance. Since Malaysian authorities know of the omitted footage, they
are clearly biased against the suspect, intentionally tampering with evidence.
Assume the following arguments (with attacks and supports):
a1: After the victim was attacked with VX, the suspect walked quickly to a restroom for
washing hands.
1 A possible-world-semantic observation that some arguments may be unusable was made [3].
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Kim_Jong-nam.
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a2: The suspect knew VX was on her hands.
a3: The suspect was acting for a prank video.
a4: The suspect adjusted her glasses with VX on her hands before walking to restroom.
a5: Malaysian authorities are biased against the suspect, tampering with evidence by in-
tentional omission of relevant CCTV footage.
a6: a1 supports a2. a7: a4 attacks a2. a8: a7 attacks a6.
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Then we can model the example argumentation as in A . Malaysian Police uses a1 for
a2 (a1 supports a2) to dismiss a3 (a2 attacks a3). All these three arguments are made
available to the audience. The defence lawyer uses a4 to counter a2. a4 is also available to
the audience as attacking a2. He then uses a7, which is itself an argumentation, to attack
Malaysian Police’ argumentation a6. This is also presented to the audience. Finally, he
uses a8, an argumentation, for a5.
Arguments of the kinds of a6, a7 and a8 are themselves argumentations, so “a7 attacks
a6” could be detailed as in B , and “a8 supports a5” as in C .
Constraints. These non-elementary arguments occur in natural language constructs such
as “The fact: [something criticises (supports) something] is at odds with (in support of)
something”, “The sentiment: [something is being defeated by something] enforces some-
thing”, and so on, which thus appear rather commonly in practice. By recognising these
arguments, however, we seem to face some challenges to the semantic account given in
Dung classic abstract argumentation theory [10]. Assume, for instance, that argumentation
as in B : “a7 attacks a6”, i.e. “The fact: [the suspect adjusted her glasses with VX on her
hands before walking to restroom counter-evidences her knowledge of the substance on her
hands] attacks the argument: [she knew VX was on her hands because, after attacking the
victim with VX, she walked quickly to a restroom for washing hands].”, is given without
any prior mention of arguments a1, a2 and a4. Then, we do not even know what relations
may hold between them. Regardless, any argument not attacked is always justified in clas-
sic theory, according to which a7, i.e. that a4 attacks a2, is an acceptable argument, while
in the first place nothing is known about a2 and a4 that would enable us to see a4’s attack
on a2 [21]. Essentially, the problem boils down to one’s interpretation of acceptance of an
argument. When we accept an argument, are we only accepting the fact that it has resisted
refutations, or are we also accepting the information in the argument?
On many occasions, acceptance of an argument means the latter, for which the classic
prediction could appear hasty and possibly unsafe, more so in block argumentation, for
an argument can be explicitly seen appearing multiple times, and one may like to impose
certain constraints to enforce argument’s dependency on the same argument that occurs in
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a given argumentation. For B , the constraint to be imposed could be the presence of the
argumentation involving a1, a2 and a4 outside the blocks, as in A . With it, it is immediate
whether the argumentation in the argument a6 or a7 actually refers to a part of an already
known argumentation. We envision both graphical (syntactic) and semantic constraints in
this paper (more details are provided in Section 4).
3 Technical Preliminaries
Let A be a class of abstract entities we understand as arguments. We refer to a member
of A by a with or without a subscript and/or a superscript, and a finite subset of A by A
with or without a subscript. A bipolar argumentation framework (e.g. see [9]) is a tuple
(A,R,Rs) with two binary relations R and Rs over A. For any (A,R,Rs), A1 ⊆ A is
said to attack, or support, A2 ⊆ A if and only if, or iff, there exist a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2
such that (a1, a2) ∈ R (for attack), or (a1, a2) ∈ Rs (for support).
An extension-based acceptability semantics of (A,R,Rs) is a family ofA (i.e. a subset
of power set of A). When Rs is not taken into account, a semantics of (A,R,Rs) is effec-
tively that of (A,R), a Dung abstract argumentation framework [10]. In Dung’s, A1 ⊆ A
is said to defend ax ∈ A iff each ay ∈ A attacking ax is attacked by at least one member of
A1, and said to be conflict-free iff A1 does not attack A1. A1 ⊆ A is said to be: admissible
iff it is conflict-free and defended; complete iff it is admissible and includes all arguments
it defends; preferred iff it is a maximal complete set; and grounded iff it is the set inter-
section of all complete sets. Complete / preferred / grounded semantics is the set of all
complete / preferred / grounded sets. The grounded set defined as the set intersection may
not be a complete set [5] in non-classic setting; it, however, reflects the attitude of sceptic
acceptance, the whole point of the grounded semantics, which would not be necessarily
fulfilled if the grounded set were defined the least complete set.
A label-based acceptability semantics [8] for Dung’s (A,R) makes use of the set L
of three elements, say {+,−, ?}, and the class Λ of all functions from A to L. While,
normally, it is {in,out,undec}, by {+,−, ?} we avoid direct acceptability readings off
them. λ ∈ Λ is said to be a complete labelling of (A,R) iff:
– λ(a) = + iff λ(ap) = − for every ap ∈ A that attacks a.
– λ(a) = − iff there is some ap ∈ A with λ(ap) = + that attacks a.
A1 ⊆ A is the set of all arguments that map into + under complete labelling iff A1 is a
complete set, thus a label-based semantics provides the same information as an extension-
based semantics does, and more because it classifies the remaining arguments in − and ?.
In bipolar argumentation where Rs properly matters for an acceptability semantics, the
notion of support is given a particular interpretation which influences the semantics.3 Rs
can be used also for the purpose of expressing premise-conclusion relation in structured
argumentation [16,11] among arguments, which will be separately discussed in Section 5.
3 See [9] for a survey of three popular types: deductive support [6] (for any member of a semantics,
if (a1, a2) ∈ Rs and if a1 is in the member, then a2 is also in the member); evidential support
[19,1] (for any member of a semantics, if a is in the member, then it can be traced back throughRs
to some indisputable arguments in the member) and necessary support [17,18] (for any member
of a semantics, if (a1, a2) ∈ Rs and if a2 is in the member, then so must a1 also be).
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4 Block (Bipolar) Argumentation
Let N be the class of natural numbers including 0. We refer to its member by n with or
without a subscript. Let X be a class of an uncountable number of abstract entities. We
refer to a member of X by x with or without a subscript. It will be assumed that every
member of X is distinguishable from any other members. Further, every member of X has
no intersection with any others. Lack of these assumptions is not convenient if one wants
to know equality of two arguments for graphical and semantic constraints.4
Definition 1 (Arguments and argumentations). We define a (block) argument a ∈ A to
be either ({x}, ∅, ∅) for some x ∈ X or ({a1, . . . , an}, Rp, Rsp) for some a1, . . . , an ∈ A
and some binary relations Rp and Rsp over {a1, . . . , an}. We say a ∈ A is unitary iff a is
some ({x}, ∅, ∅).
We define a Block (Bipolar) Argumentation (BBA) to be some argument (A,R,Rs)
∈ A. We say that it is finite iff the number of occurrences of symbols is finite in A.5 We
denote the class of all finite BBAs by ABBA, a subclass of A, and refer to its member by
aBBA with or without a subscript.
Example 1 (BBA argumentation). Denote the argumentation A in Section 2 by aBBA.
aBBA = ({a1, . . . , a8}, {(a4, a2), (a2, a3), (a7, a6)}, {(a1, a2), (a8, a5)}).
ai = ({xi}, ∅, ∅) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5. a6 = ({a1, a2}, ∅, {(a1, a2)}).
a7 = ({a2, a4}, {(a4, a2)}, ∅). a8 = ({a6, a7}, {(a7, a6)}, ∅).
4.1 Representation of Argument(ation)s
To refer to arguments in a specific position in aBBA, we make use of:
Definition 2 (Flat representation). Let 〈N〉 denote the class of all sequences of natural
numbers (an empty sequence is included), whose member is referred to by 〈m〉 with or
without a subscript, or by a specific sequence of natural numbers. We use ‘.’ for sequence
concatenation. Let $ : A → 2A×〈N〉 be such that $(a) is the least set that satisfies all the
following.
1. (a, 0) ∈ $(a).
2. For any (ap, 〈m〉) ∈ $(a), if ap is not unitary and is some {a1, . . . , anp}, then
(ai, 〈m〉.ni) ∈ $(a) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ np such that all n1, . . . , nnp are distinct.
For any a and any n, we say that $(a) is its flat representation.
Example 2 (Flat representation). (Continued) For the same example argumentation aBBA
in A , we can define its flat representation $(aBBA) to be the set of all the following. Just
for disambiguation, we demarcate the constituents in a sequence of natural numbers with
‘.’.
4 Alternatively, we can assume a domain of discourse and interpretation as customary in formal
logic; see [14] or any other standard text for the foundation of mathematical logic.
5 As in set theory (see [13]), this is not equivalent to finiteness in the number of members of A.
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(aBBA, 0). (ai, 0.i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 8. (a1, 0.6.1) and (a2, 0.6.2).
(a2, 0.7.1) and (a4, 0.7.2). (a6, 0.8.1) and (a7, 0.8.2).
(a1, 0.8.1.1) and (a2, 0.8.1.2). (a2, 0.8.2.1) and (a4, 0.8.2.2).
Definition 3 (Order in flat representation). Let w: (A × 〈N〉) × (A × 〈N〉) be such
that ((ap, 〈mp〉), (aq, 〈mq〉)) ∈ w, synonymously written as (ap, 〈mp〉) w (aq, 〈mq〉), iff
〈mp〉.〈mr〉 = 〈mq〉 for some 〈mr〉. We write (ap, 〈mp〉) A (aq, 〈mq〉) iff (ap, 〈mp〉) w
(aq, 〈mq〉) and (aq, 〈mq〉) 6w (ap, 〈mp〉).6
4.2 Characterisation of Complete Sets with No Constraints
We characterise complete sets with no constraints initially.
Definition 4 (Arguments, attacks and supports in 〈m〉). Let Arg : ABBA × 〈N〉 → 2A
be such that Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) = Ap iff ((Ap, R,Rs), 〈m〉) ∈ $(aBBA) for some R and
Rs. Let Attck,Spprt : ABBA × 〈N〉 → 2A×A be such that:
Attck(aBBA, 〈m〉) = {(a1, a2) ∈ R | ∃((A,R,Rs), 〈m〉) ∈ $(aBBA). a1, a2 ∈ A}
Spprt(aBBA, 〈m〉) = {(a1, a2) ∈ Rs | ∃((A,R,Rs), 〈m〉) ∈ $(aBBA). a1, a2 ∈ A}
For any aBBA and any 〈m〉, we say:
Ap is the set of arguments in 〈m〉 iff Ap = Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉).
a1 attacks a2 in 〈m〉 iff (a1, a2) ∈ Attck(aBBA, 〈m〉).
a1 supports a2 in 〈m〉 iff (a1, a2) ∈ Spprt(aBBA, 〈m〉).
While there are three typical interpretations (deductive, necessary, evidential) of support
in the literature, they enforce a strong dependency between arguments and the arguments
that support them concerning their acceptance. In light of the example in Section 2, our
interpretation of support here is weaker, almost supplementary, as in the following defi-
nitions. Briefly, it is not necessary that an argument be in a complete set when its sup-
porter/supportee is in the set. A supporter can, however, prevent an argument attacked by
an attacker from being strongly rejected (with labels, it concerns the difference of whether
the argument gets − (which leads to strong rejection) or ?). We look at extension-based
complete set characterisation first.
Definition 5 (Extension-based complete set when no constraints). For any aBBA and
any 〈m〉, we say:A1 defends a in 〈m〉 iffA1 ⊆ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) and a ∈ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉)
and every a1 attacking a in 〈m〉 is: attacked by at least some a2 ∈ A1; and not supported
by any a3 ∈ A1.
We say that A1 is conflict-free in 〈m〉 iff A1 ⊆ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) and (a1, a2) 6∈
Attck(aBBA, 〈m〉) for any a1, a2 ∈ A1.
We say that A1 is standard complete in 〈m〉 iff A1 ⊆ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) and A1 is
conflict-free and includes all arguments it defends in 〈m〉.
6 “and” instead of “and” is used in this paper when the context in which it appears strongly indicates
truth-value comparisons. It follows the semantics of classical logic conjunction.
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Example 3 (Complete set with no constraints). (Continued) For aBBA in A , we have only
one standard complete set in 0 with this characterisation, namely {a1, a4, a5, a7, a8}. To
explain the role of a supporter to prevent strong rejection of an argument, notice that a1,
which is in the standard complete set in 0, supports a2, which is attacked by a4 in the same
standard complete set in 0. If it were not for the supporter, a3 would be in the standard
complete set in 0.
We can also have a label-based characterisation with L(= {+,−, ?}).
Definition 6 (Complete labelling when no constraints).
Let Λ be the class of all λ : A × 〈N〉 → L such that λ((a, 〈m〉)) = l for some l. For
any aBBA and any λ ∈ Λ, we say that λ is a standard complete labelling of aBBA iff every
({a1, . . . , an}, 〈m〉) ∈ $(aBBA) satisfies all the following.
– λ((ai, 〈m〉.ni)) = +, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, iff every aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, attacking ai in 〈m〉 satisfies
λ((aj , 〈m〉.nj)) = −.
– λ((ai, 〈m〉.ni)) = −, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, iff there exists some 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that λ((aj , 〈m〉.nj))
= + and that aj attacks ai in 〈m〉 and there is no 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that λ((ak, 〈m〉.nk)) =
+ and that ak supports ai in 〈m〉.
Theorem 1 (Correspondence between standard complete sets and standard complete
labellings). For any aBBA and any 〈m〉, A1 ⊆ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) is standard complete in
〈m〉 only if there is some standard complete labelling λ of aBBA such that λ((ap, 〈m〉.n)) =
+ is equivalent to ap ∈ A1 for any (ap, 〈m〉.n) ∈ $(aBBA). Conversely, λ is a standard
complete labelling of aBBA only if, for every (a, 〈m〉) ∈ $(aBBA), {ap ∈ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) |
∃n ∈ N.λ((ap, 〈m〉.n)) = +} is a standard complete set in 〈m〉.
On the basis of this correspondence, we will work mainly with labels, as they simplify
referrals of arguments that do not get +.
4.3 Graphical (Syntactic) Constraints
We now characterise constraints, which can be graphical (syntactic) or semantic. The for-
mer enforces that any argumentation within an argument(ation) has already occurred, while
the latter enforces that acceptability statuses of arguments in any argumentation respect in
a certain way those of the same arguments that have already occurred. We begin with a
graphical one, for which we need to be able to tell equality of two arguments.
Definition 7 (Argument equality). Let Eq : A×A be such that Eq(a1, a2) iff one of the
following conditions is satisfied.
– a1 = a2 = ({x}, ∅, ∅) for some x ∈ X .
– If a1 is some ({a′′1 , . . . , a′′n}, R1, Rs1), then a2 is some ({a′1, . . . , a′n}, R2, Rs2) such that:
• Eq(a′′i , a′i);
• (a′′i , a′′j ) ∈ R1 iff (a′i, a′j) ∈ R2;
• and (a′′i , a′′j ) ∈ Rs1 iff (a′i, a′j) ∈ Rs2
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
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Definition 8 (Sub-argumentation). Let ↘: A × A be such that ((A1, R1, Rs1), (A2,
R2, R
s
2)) ∈↘, written synonymously as (A1, R1, Rs1) ↘ (A2, R2, Rs2) iff A2 = {a′1, . . . ,
a′n2} and A1 = {a1, . . . , an1} are such that:
– |A2| ≤ |A1|.
– For each a′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n2, there exists some aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n1, such that Eq(a′i, aj).
– For each two a′i1 , a
′
i2
, 1 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ n2, if (a′i1 , a′i2) ∈ R2, then there exist some aj1 , aj2 ,
1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ n1 such that (aj1 , aj2) ∈ R1, that Eq(a′i1 , aj1), and that Eq(a′i2 , aj2).
– For each two a′i1 , a
′
i2
, 1 ≤ i1, i2 ≤ n2, if (a′i1 , a′i2) ∈ Rs2, then there exist some aj1 , aj2 ,
1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ n1 such that (aj1 , aj2) ∈ Rs1, that Eq(a′i1 , aj1), and that Eq(a′i2 , aj2).
We say that a2 is a sub-argumentation of a1 iff a1 ↘ a2.
Definition 9 (Graphical (syntactic) constraints). For any aBBA, we say that
(a2, 〈m2〉) ∈ $(aBBA) satisfies G iff both of the conditions below hold.
1. If 〈m2〉 6= 0 and if a2 is not unitary, then there exists some (a1, 〈m1〉) ∈ $(aBBA)
such that (a1, 〈m1〉) A (a2, 〈m2〉) and that a1 ↘ a2.
2. Every (ap, 〈m2〉.n) ∈ $(aBBA) satisfies G.
Example 4 (Graphical (syntactic) constraints). (Continued) As has been the case so far,
let aBBA be the argumentation in A . and let its flat representation be as given in Example
2. Then aBBA clearly satisfies G for any (a, 〈m〉) ∈ $(aBBA), since:
– (aBBA, 0): there is nothing to show, as the sequence is 0.
– (ai, 0.i), 1 ≤ i ≤ 5: there is nothing to show, as a1,...,5 are unitary.
– (a6, 0.6): aBBA ↘ ({a1, a2}, ∅, {(a1, a2)}).
– (ai, 0.6.i), 1 ≤ i ≤ 2: there is nothing to show, as a1 and a2 are unitary.
– (a7, 0.7): aBBA ↘ ({a2, a4}, {(a4, a2)}, ∅).
– (a2, 0.7.1), (a4, 0.7.2): there is nothing to show, as a2 and a4 are unitary.
– (a8, 0.8): aBBA ↘ ({a6, a7}, {(a7, a6)}, ∅).
– (a6, 0.8.1): see above for (a6, 0.6).
– (a7, 0.8.2): see above for (a7, 0.7).
– (ai, 0.8.1.i), 1 ≤ i ≤ 2: there is nothing to show.
– (a2, 0.8.2.1) and (a4, 0.8.2.2): there is nothing to show.
For comparison, however, suppose that aBBA is the argumentation in B , i.e. aBBA =
({a6, a7}, {a7, a6}, ∅), a6 = ({a1, a2}, ∅, {(a1, a2)}), and a7 = ({a2, a4}, {(a4, a2)}, ∅).
Assume (a6, 0.1), (a7, 0.2) ∈ $(aBBA), then neither of them satisfies G, because none of
a1, a2, a4 are in Arg(aBBA, 0).
Since the graph structure of a given aBBA never changes, violation of the graphical con-
straint monotonically propagates up to 〈m〉 = 0 (0 excluded) from longer sequences. Thus,
it is rather straightforward to handle graphical constraint satisfaction.
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4.4 Semantic constraints
By contrast, semantic constraint satisfaction depends on what labels are assigned to argu-
ments, which adds to technical subtlety. We define a partial order on L, and characterise
semantic constraints based on them.
Definition 10 (Order in labels). Let : L×L be {(?,+), (?,−), (+,+), (−,−), (?, ?)}.
We write (l1, l2) ∈ alternatively as l1  l2.
Definition 11 (Semantic constraints). For any aBBA and for any λ ∈ Λ, we say that
(a2, 〈m2〉) ∈ $(aBBA) and λ satisfy:
S iff for every (a1, 〈m1〉) ∈ $(aBBA), if Eq(a1, a2) and (a1, 〈m1〉) A (a2, 〈m2〉), then
λ((a1, 〈m1〉))  λ((a2, 〈m2〉)).
? iff, for any (a1, 〈m1〉) ∈ $(aBBA), if there exist some 〈m3〉, n1 and n2 such that
〈m3〉.n1 = 〈m1〉 and that 〈m3〉.n2 = 〈m2〉, and if Eq(a1, a2), then λ((a1, 〈m1〉))
= λ((a2, 〈m2〉)).
To speak of the use of, there should be no oddity from a semantic coherency perspective
when λ((a1, 〈m1)) = λ((a2, 〈m2〉)) for every (a1, 〈m1〉), (a2, 〈m2〉) ∈ $(aBBA) such
that Eq(a1, a2). That just means that same arguments in aBBA are assigned the same label.
However, consider our example A . There, a2 in Arg(aBBA, 0) which is assigned ? by a
standard complete labelling is given − in Arg(a6, 0.6) by the Malaysian authorities and +
in Arg(a7, 0.7) by the defence lawyer. ? assigned to an argument in 〈m〉, therefore, can be
interpreted flexibly in argumentation in 〈m〉.〈mp〉, that it can be any of +, −, ? depending
on which part of the argumentation in 〈m〉 is selected to be included in the argumentation
in 〈m〉.〈mp〉 (for some non-empty 〈mp〉). This is the intuition for  and its use in S.
The ? symbol denotes a semantic constraint among the members of Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉)
for some 〈m〉, to prevent the same arguments from being assigned a different label.
Example 5 (Semantic constraints).
D
a1a0 Attacks
a2 a3 a4Attacks Attacks
E
a1Attacks
a2 a3 a4Attacks Attacks
a4a3 Attacks
F
a6a5 Attacks
a7 a8Attacks
Attacks
a10Attacksa9
Denote the argumentation in D by aBBA. Assume that a0 = ({a3, a4}, {(a3, a4)}, ∅)
as shown in E , and assume that a1, . . . , a4 are all unitary such that Eq(ai, aj) for no
distinct 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 4. Assume (aBBA, 0), (a0, 0.0), (a1, 0.1), (a2, 0.2), (a3, 0.3), (a4, 0.4),
(a3, 0.0.1), (a4, 0.0.2) ∈ $(aBBA). The following are all the standard complete labelling
distinct for aBBA.
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– λ1((ai, 0.i)) = + for i ∈ {0, 2, 4}, λ1((ai, 0.i)) = − for i ∈ {1, 3},
λ1((a3, 0.0.1)) = +, λ1((a4, 0.0.2)) = −.
– λ2((ai, 0.i)) = + for i ∈ {0, 3}, λ2((ai, 0.i)) = − for i ∈ {1, 2, 4}.
λ2((a3, 0.0.1)) = +, λ2((a4, 0.0.2)) = −.
– λ3((a0, 0.0)) = +, λ3((a1, 0.1)) = −, λ3((ai, 0.i)) = ? for i ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
λ3((a3, 0.0.1)) = +, λ3((a4, 0.0.2)) = −.
λ1 and ((a3, 0.0.1)) do not satisfy S. λ2 and ((a3, 0.0.1)) do. Now, while λ3((a3, 0.3)) =
? 6= + = λ3((a3, 0.0.1)) and λ3((a4, 0.4)) = ? 6= − = λ3((a4, 0.0.2)), S is respected,
since ?  +,−.
Denote the argumentation in F by aBBA. Assume (aBBA, 0), (ai, 0.i) ∈ $(aBBA)
for 5 ≤ i ≤ 10. Assume Eq(a5, a7) and Eq(a9, a8). There is a standard complete labelling
λ of aBBA such that λ((a5, 0.5)) = λ((0.7, 0.7)) = λ((a9, 0.9)) = +, λ((a6, 0.6)) =
λ((a8, 0.8)) = λ((a10, 0.10)) = −. Then it could be understood that the same argument
(a8 and a9) in 0 is assigned both + and− simultaneously, which on some occasions outside
of rhetoric argumentation is not convenient. ? is the condition against such labelling.
4.5 Generalisation of standard complete labelling
Let us refine our earlier definition of standard complete labelling with those constraints.
We define C to be {G,S, ?}, and refer to its subset by C with or without a subscript.
Definition 12 (Complete labelling). For any aBBA, any λ ∈ Λ and any C, we say that
λ is a complete labelling of aBBA under C iff every ({a1, . . . , an}, 〈m〉) ∈ $(aBBA)
satisfies all the following conditions.
– λ((ai, 〈m〉.ni)) = +, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, iff both:
• every aj , ≤ j ≤ n, attacking ai in 〈m〉 satisfies λ((aj , 〈m〉.nj)) = −.
• if {S, ?} ∈ C, then assigning + to (ai, 〈m〉.ni) does not lead to non-satisfaction of
a semantic constraint c ∈ C for any (a, 〈m1〉) ∈ $(aBBA).
– λ((ai, 〈m〉.ni)) = −, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, iff both:
• there exists some 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that λ((aj , 〈m〉.nj)) = + and that aj attacks
ai in 〈m〉 and there is no 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that λ((ak, 〈m〉.nk)) = + and that ak
supports ai in 〈m〉.
• if {S, ?} ∈ C, then assigning − to (ai, 〈m〉.ni) does not lead to non-satisfaction of
a semantic constraint c ∈ C for any (a, 〈m1〉) ∈ $(aBBA).
– λ((ai, 〈m〉.ni)) 6= +, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if G ∈ C and (ai, 〈m〉.ni) does not satisfy G.
Any argument that violates the graphic constraint will not be assigned + if G ∈ C. For both
+ and −, the first condition matches exactly the condition given for a standard complete
labelling. The second condition ensures conditions for a standard complete labelling to be
maximally respected, in the sense that they normally apply unless by applying them there
will be a non-satisfaction of a semantic constraint c ∈ C.
Broader intuition is as follows. If a standard labelling of aBBA satisfies all c ∈ C,
then the standard complete labelling should itself be a complete labelling under C. Thus,
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when a standard complete labelling is not a complete labelling under C, it is because the
labelling either induces violation of some semantic constraint c ∈ C for some arguments
occurring in aBBA or + assignment to an argument that violates the graphic constraint if
G ∈ C. In such cases, therefore, it will be required to make minimal change to the standard
complete labelling so the resulting labelling satisfies semantic constraints (if they are in C)
and does not assign + to an argument that violates G (if it is in C). The second conditions
for + and − ensure that the change be indeed minimal with a complete labelling.
Example 6 (Complete labelling). (Continued) For the argumentation in D with the same
assumptions and λ1,2,3 as in Example 5, λ1 is not a complete labelling under C if S ∈ C:
(a0, 0.0) is assigned +, however, it does not satisfy S, so it should be assigned ?. λ2 and λ3
are a complete labelling under anyC. In addition, λ4 such that λ4((ai, 0.i)) =?, i ∈ {0, 1},
λ4((a2, 0.2)) = λ4((a4, 0.4)) = +, λ4((a3, 0.3)) = − is a complete labelling. λ4 is not a
standard complete labelling.
Theorem 2 (Conservation). For any aBBA and any λ, if C = ∅, then λ being a complete
labelling of aBBA underC is equivalent to λ being a standard complete labelling of aBBA.
Theorem 3 (No inclusion). For any C 6= ∅, there exists aBBA such that some standard
complete labelling of aBBA is not a complete labelling under C and that some complete
labelling of aBBA under C is not a standard complete labelling.
This result holds even for aBBA that does not involve any support (see Example 6).
4.6 Acceptability Semantics
Definition 13 (Types of complete sets and acceptability semantics). For any aBBA, we
say that A1 ⊆ Arg(aBBA, 0) is: complete under C iff there exists a complete labelling λ ∈
Λ of aBBA underC such thatA1 = {a ∈ A | ∃n ∈ N ∃(a, 0.n) ∈ $(aBBA).λ((a, 0.n)) =
+}; grounded under C iff it is the set intersection of all complete sets under C; preferred
under C iff it is a maximal complete set under C; and semi-grounded iff it is a minimal
complete set.
We call the set of all complete / grounded / semi-grounded / preferred sets under some
C complete / grounded / semi-grounded / preferred semantics under C.
Note that ultimately we need to tell which subsets of Arg(aBBA, 0) are acceptable: this
explains why we only look at 〈m〉 = 0 for the semantics.
Example 7 (Acceptability semantics). (Continued) For the argumentation in D with the
same assumptions as in Example 5, if S 6∈ C, then we have the following semantics.
complete: {{a0}, {a0, a2, a4}, {a0, a3}}. grounded: {{a0}}.
semi-grounded: {{a0}}. preferred: {{a0, a2, a4}, {a0, a3}}.
If S ∈ C, then we have the following semantics.
complete: {{a0}, {a3}, {a0, a2, a4}}. grounded: {∅}.
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semi-grounded: {{a0}, {a3}} preferred: {{a3}, {a0, a2, a4}}.
For the argumentation in F with the same assumptions as in Example 5, if ? ∈ C, then we
have {{a5}, {a9}, {a5, a9}} (complete), {∅} (grounded), {{a5}, {a9}} (semi-grounded)
and {{a5, a9}} (preferred).
Theorem 4 (Existence). For any aBBA and any C, we have all the following:
1. There exists at least one complete set under C.
2. The grounded set may not be a complete set under C.
3. A semi-grounded set is a complete set under C.
4. If there is only one semi-grounded set, then it is the grounded set under C.
Additionally, if S, ? 6∈ C, but not necessarily otherwise, there is only one semi-grounded
set under C.
5 Related Work and Conclusion
Structured Argumentation. Structured argumentation [11,16] lets arguments associated
in premise-conclusion relation. Consider ABA-style structured argumentation [11]:
(H, I,J ,K) for: some finite setH of entities; I : H× 2H; ∅ 6⊆ J ⊆ H; and K : J → H.
H1 ⊆ H is said to support h1 ∈ H iff (h1, H1) ∈ I. For any (h,H) ∈ I, if H 6= ∅, then
h ∈ H\J . This tuple (H, I,J ,K) ought to be such that the set T below exists.
Let T : H × 2T be the least set satisfying both (1) (h, ∅) ∈ T if h ∈ J , and (2) if
(h1, t1), . . . , (hn, tn) ∈ T and if (h0, {h1, . . . , hn}) ∈ I, then (h0, {(h1, t1), . . . , (hn, tn)})
∈ T . Every t ∈ T is an argument in ABA. (h1, t′1) ∈ T attacks t2 ∈ T iff K(h) = h1 for
some h ∈ J occurring in t2. T1 ⊆ T defends t ∈ T just when every tp ∈ T attacking t
is attacked by at least some tq ∈ T1. It is complete just when: (1) there is no attack among
the members of T1; and (2) it includes all t ∈ T it defends.
Encoding of ABA into aBBA = (A,R,Rs) is rather smooth. We define X to be such
that xh ∈ X iff h ∈ J . We define A to be the least set that satisfies both: (1) ah =
({xh}, ∅, ∅) is in A if (h, ∅) ∈ T for some h; and (2) at = ({aT1 , ah}, ∅, {(aT1 , ah)})
such that aT1 = ({at1 , . . . , atn}, ∅, ∅) is in A if T1 = {t1, . . . , tn} for some T1 ⊆ T
and some h such that (h, T1) ∈ T . We define R to be such that (a1, a2) ∈ R for some
a1, a2 ∈ A iff, if a1 (a2) is the encoding of t1 ∈ T (t2 ∈ T ), then t1 attacks t2. Finally, we
define Rs to be empty. Then A1 ⊆ A is a complete set (〈m〉 = 0) under C = ∅ iff T1 ⊆ T
such that A1 is the encoding of T1 is complete. Trivially, ABA is an instance of BBA.
More than just the result of subsumption, the process of encoding highlights the degree
of structuralisation allowed in BBA and ABA, which is similarly true of ASPIC [16]: (1)
support (premise-conclusion) in ABA is accessible for a child (premise) of a subtree of
t ∈ T , but no support, if it should occur in the parent (conclusion) of a subtree of T , is ac-
cessible. That is, for the argument: [something is a support for [that something is a support
for something]], the outer support is accessible in ABA formalisation, but the inner sup-
port, within the conclusion, must be encapsulated. BBA relaxes this restriction. Similarly,
(2) any construct of the sort: [[that something attacks something] supports something] is
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expressed in ABA by encapsulating the inner attack. In BBA, the inner attack is also ac-
cessible. The concept of block argumentation thus allows for a greater reach to the internal
structure of arguments. It is our hope, then, that the study in this paper will be of interest
also to the scientific community working on structured argumentation.
Dependency among Arguments. Dung abstract argumentation does not specify the nature
of an abstract entity. It is possible two arguments in an argumentation graph are interpreted
identical. For rhetoric argumentation, acceptance of an argument may be considered with
respect to the position in the graph in which it occurs; thus such a scenario incurs com-
paratively small an issue. Outside rhetoric argumentation, however, acceptability statuses
of arguments are often preferred to be regarded indicative of acceptance of the arguments
and not their acceptance with respect to their positions in the graph. It is then that multiple
occurrences of the same argument in a graph are less desirable. An extreme case is “a1 at-
tacks a2”. In case they are interpreted the same, classic semantics predict the argument to
be both acceptable and not acceptable, and yet it sceptically accepts it, i.e. a1. Such issue
from dependencies seems to have been seldom reflected back to abstract argumentation
semantics. In abstract dialectical frameworks [7], acceptability statuses of arguments are
given based on those of their attackers/supporters. In this work, we showed that practically
any arguments in a graph, whether or not they are connected, may have dependencies. We
proposed use of both graphical and semantic constraints.
Higher-Level and Meta Argumentation. Meta argumentation [15,22] facilitates layers of
argumentation, to discuss attack relation among arguments and so on in a preceding layer.
From a layer to a layer, there is a clear boundary (and the separation does not disappear if
one is to flatten them). Our motivating example in Section 2 shows, however, that [some-
thing attacks something] may itself be an argument, which BBA can handle uniformly as
with unitary ones. Temporal / modal argumentation networks [3], as far as we are aware,
is the first abstract argumentation study that hinted at the possibility that an unattacked
argument may not be outright accepted. A temporal argument a asks effectively if a
is accepted in the argumentation at a connected possible world for the argument to be
accepted-able. The temporal argument allows an argument in another possible world to be
referred to. In this work, we have generalised such semantic dependency with the seman-
tic constraints. Higher-level argumentation [12] considers substitution of an argumentation
framework into an argument to identify which arguments in the substituted argumentation
are the actual interactors to the outside. By contrast, in block argumentation, the key is to
express the dual roles of an argument: as an argument and as an argumentation (similar
emphasis given for coalition formation [2]) and how they influence acceptability seman-
tics. In block argumentation, it is possible that an argument as an argumentation, and not
necessarily some arguments in the argumentation, attacks or supports other arguments.
Conclusion. We presented block argumentation, with comparisons to structured argumen-
tation for which we have demonstrated a prospect of further generalisation. Block argu-
mentation reveals multiple occurrences of the same arguments within an argumentation,
and, as we have identified, both graphical and semantic coherency pose challenges to the
classic principle of always accepting unattacked arguments. We proposed to tackle this is-
sue with constraints. For future work, we plan to study their granularity to cater for specific
applications, as well as to incorporate probabilistic or dynamic approaches.
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Appendix (Proofs)
Theorem 1 (Correspondence between extension-based complete sets and complete la-
bellings). For any aBBA and any 〈m〉,A1 ⊆ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) is standard complete in 〈m〉
only if there is some standard complete labelling λ of aBBA such that λ((ap, 〈m〉.n)) = +
is equivalent to ap ∈ A1 for any (ap, 〈m〉.n) ∈ $(aBBA). Conversely, λ is a standard
complete labelling of aBBA only if, for every (a, 〈m〉) ∈ $(aBBA), {ap ∈ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) | ∃n ∈
N.λ((ap, 〈m〉.n)) = +} is a standard complete set in 〈m〉.
Proof. Assume A1 ⊆ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) is standard complete in 〈m〉. Assume some λ ∈ Λ
such that λ((ap, 〈m〉.n)) = + for any (ap, 〈m〉.n) ∈ $(aBBA) with ap ∈ A1, that
λ((ap, 〈m〉.n)) = − for any (ap, 〈m〉.n) ∈ $(aBBA) with ap ∈ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) if
ap is attacked by A1, and that λ((ap, 〈m〉.n)) = ? for any other (ap, 〈m〉.n) ∈ $(aBBA)
with ap ∈ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉). We show that λ is a standard complete labelling. We show
firstly that every (ap, 〈m〉.n) ∈ $(aBBA) such that λ((ap, 〈m〉.n)) = + satisfies the cor-
responding condition (Definition 6). Suppose, by way of showing contradiction, that there
is some (ap, 〈m〉.n) ∈ $(aBBA) such that λ((ap, 〈m〉.n)) = + does not satisfy the cor-
responding condition. Then, there must exist some (a1, 〈m〉.n1) ∈ $(aBBA)) such that
λ((a1, 〈m〉.n1)) = + and that a1 attacks ap in 〈m〉. However, it cannot be +, since A1
is conflict-free, contradiction. Second, we show that every (ap, 〈m〉.n) ∈ $(aBBA) such
that λ((ap, 〈m〉.n)) = − satisfies the corresponding condition (Definition 6). By construc-
tion of λ, however, ap is attacked by a member of A1. Since A1 is defended, there exists
no member of A1 that supports ap. Finally, we show that every (ap, 〈m〉.n) ∈ $(aBBA)
such that λ((ap, 〈m〉.n)) = ? does not satisfy the conditions for + or− (Definition 6). If it
satisfied the condition for +, then every a1 attacking it would get −. By construction of λ,
however, every such a1 would be attacked by a member of A1 in 〈m〉. Since A1 includes
all arguments it defends in 〈m〉, it follows that ap ∈ A1, contradiction. If it satisfied the
condition for −, then it would be attacked by a member of A1 in 〈m〉. By construction of
λ, it is not possible that ap gets ?.
For the second part, assume λ is a standard complete labelling. Assume also some 〈m〉
such that Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) is non-empty. Assume A1 = {ap ∈ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) | ∃n ∈
N.λ((ap, 〈m〉.n)) = +}. We show that A1 is standard complete. A1 is trivially conflict-
free. Now, suppose some a1 ∈ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) attacking a member of A1. Since λ is a
standard complete labelling, it must be that a1 gets− in 〈m〉, which means that A1 attacks
but does not support a1 in 〈m〉. Thus A1 defends its members attacked by a1. By the defi-
nition of λ, it is straightforward to see that A1 includes all arguments it defends. uunionsq
Theorem 2 (Conservation). For any aBBA and any λ, if C = ∅, then λ being a complete
labelling of aBBA underC is equivalent to λ being a standard complete labelling of aBBA.
Proof. Trivial. uunionsq
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Theorem 3 (No inclusion). For any C 6= ∅, there exists aBBA such that some standard
complete labelling of aBBA is not a complete labelling under C and that some complete
labelling of aBBA under C is not a standard complete labelling.
Proof. See Example 6 when C contains S or ?. For C = {G}, consider the argumentation
in B as aBBA. uunionsq
For the last theorem, it helps to define order on labelling that judges one labelling strictly
more informative than another when the former preserves + and − assignments by the
latter but assigns a smaller number of ?.
Definition 14 (Order in labelling). LetB : ABBA×Λ×Λ be such that (aBBA, λ1, λ2) ∈
B, written alternatively as λ1 Ba
BBA
λ2 iff λ2((ap, 〈mp〉))  λ1((ap, 〈mp〉)) for every
(ap, 〈mp〉) ∈ $(aBBA). For any λ1, λ2 ∈ Λ and for any aBBA, we say that λ1 is more
informative than λ2 iff λ2Ba
BBA
λ1. In particular, λ1 is strictly more informative than λ2
iff λ2 Ba
BBA
λ1 and λ1 6 BaBBAλ2.
We say, further, that there is a path from a1 to a2 in 〈m〉 iff a1, a2 ∈ Arg(aBBA, 〈m〉) and
either: a1 attacks a2; or else there is a path from a1 to some a3 such that a3 attacks a2.
Lemma 1. Let aBBA be a member of ABBA, and let λ1 be a standard complete la-
belling of aBBA. Let Γ be a set of some (a1, 〈m1〉), . . . , (an, 〈mn〉) ∈ $(aBBA) such that
λ1((ai, 〈mi〉)) 6= ?. Let Λ1 be a subclass of Λ that contains all λ such that λ((ai, 〈mi〉)) =
? for any (ai, 〈mi〉) ∈ Γ but, for any other (ap, 〈mp〉) ∈ $(aBBA), that λ respects the
conditions given for a standard complete labelling. Then, there exists λ ∈ Λ1 such that λ1
is strictly more informative than λ.
Theorem 4 (Existence). For any aBBA and any C, we have all the following:
1. There exists at least one complete set under C.
2. The grounded set may not be a complete set under C.
3. A semi-grounded set is a complete set under C.
4. If there is only one unique semi-grounded set, then it is the grounded set under C.
Additionally, if S, ? 6∈ C, but not necessarily otherwise, there is only one semi-grounded
set under C.
Proof. 2. - 4. follow immediately from the preceding discussion, on the assumption that 1.
holds to be the case. Suppose, by way of showing contradiction, that there is no complete
labelling. Then, it must be that there exist some aBBA and some C such that every λ ∈ Λ
of aBBA contradicts at least one condition given in Definition 12 for some (a, 〈m〉) ∈
$(aBBA). Consider some standard complete labelling λ which always exists. By the sup-
position, λ is not a complete labelling. Therefore, there exists some (a, 〈m〉) ∈ $(aBBA)
that either does not satisfy some semantic constraint c ∈ C with λ, or violates G and yet is
assigned + with λ. Let us define the following function.
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Function down (aBBA : ABBA, λ : Λ,C : C) returns (aBBA : ABBA, λ1 : Λ,C : C).
Assume (a, 〈m〉) ∈ $(aBBA) for which λ ∈ Λ of aBBA contradicts at least one con-
dition given in Definition 12.
1. return (aBBA, λ, C) if there is no such (a, 〈m〉).
2. If λ((a, 〈mp〉.n)) ∈ {+,−} (〈m〉 = 〈mp〉.n), ? ∈ C, and (a, 〈mp〉.n) does not
satisfy ?, then there exist (a1, 〈mp〉.n1), . . . , (ak, 〈mp〉.nk) ∈ $(aBBA) such that∧
1≤i≤k Eq(a, ai) and that |
⋃
1≤i≤k λ((ai, 〈mp〉.ni))| > 1. Consider a subclass Λ1
of Λ that contains all λ1 such that λ1((a, 〈mp〉.n)) = λ1((a1, 〈mp〉.n1)) = · · · =
λ1((ak, 〈mp〉.nk)) = ?, but which otherwise respects the conditions given for a stan-
dard complete labelling. By Lemma 1, and by the fact that there is at least one
(ai, 〈mp〉.ni), 1 ≤ i ≤ k, that is not assigned ?, there exists some λ1 ∈ Λ1 such
that λ is strictly more informative than λ1. By construction, such λ1 always exists.
return (aBBA, λ1, C).
3. If λ((a, 〈m〉)) ∈ {+,−}, S ∈ C, and (a, 〈m〉) does not satisfy S: Consider a sub-
class Λ1 of Λ that contains all λ1 such that λ1((a, 〈m〉)) = ?, but which otherwise
respects the conditions given for a standard complete labelling. By Lemma 1, and by
the fact that λ((a, 〈m〉)) 6= ?, there exists some λ1 ∈ Λ1 such that λ is strictly more
informative than λ1. By construction, such λ1 always exists. return (aBBA, λ1, C).
4. If λ((a, 〈m〉)) = +, G ∈ C, and (a, 〈m〉) does not satisfy G: Consider a subclass Λ1
of Λ that contains all λ1 such that λ1((a, 〈m〉)) = ?, but which otherwise respects the
conditions given for a standard complete labelling. By Lemma 1, and by the fact that
λ((a, 〈m〉)) 6= ?, there exists some λ1 ∈ Λ1 such that λ is strictly more informative
than λ1. By construction, such λ1 always exists. return (aBBA, λ1, C).
End Function
Let (aBBA, λ1, C) be: (aBBA, λ1, C) = down
n+1(aBBA, λ, C) = downn(aBBA, λ, C)
for some n and for some standard complete labelling λ. For every (a, 〈m〉) ∈ $(aBBA),
it holds that (a, 〈m〉) and λ1 satisfy semantic constraints in C, and that λ((a, 〈m〉)) 6= +
if (a, 〈m〉) does not satisfy G if G ∈ C.
Now, consider Λ1 ⊆ Λ to be the set of all labelling λ2 such that λ2 is more infor-
mative than λ1 but not more informative than λ, and moreover that, for every (a, 〈m〉) ∈
$(aBBA), it holds that (a, 〈m〉) and λ1 satisfy semantic constraints inC, and that λ((a, 〈m〉)) 6=
+ if (a, 〈m〉) does not satisfy G if G ∈ C. Since both λ1 and λ exist, Λ1 6= ∅. It is easy to
see that a maximal element in Λ1 is a complete labelling of aBBA.
If C = G or else C = ∅, then, for any (a, 〈m〉) ∈ $(aBBA) if there is some
λ that is strictly less informative than a standard complete labelling λ1 of aBBA and
if λ((a, 〈m〉))  λ1((a, 〈m〉)), then for any complete labelling λ2 of aBBA under C,
λ2((a, 〈m〉)) = λ((a, 〈m〉)). Straightforward. Example 6 for S ∈ C and ? ∈ C. uunionsq
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